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Abstract 
 
In the face of a thought-defying catastrophe, nothing is more 
cathartic than the transformation of fact into fable. In the case of 
the Holocaust, this would amount to the fable of seeing the Nazis 
as devilish arch-villains or of reducing the Nazi genocide to a 
series of commonplaces. The aim of this paper is to show how 
Martin Amis plays with this impulse to reduce fact to fable 
precisely by having the narrator tell a fable that has to be decoded 
into fact by the reader. The focus on a perpetrator rather than a 
victim is dealt with as confronting the reader with the “banality of 
evil”, while the relationship between narrator and main character 
is approached in the view of Lifton’s concept of “psychological 
doubling”, and also in the light of Levinas’ notion of excendance. I 
argue here that Time’s Arrow should be regarded as the result of a 
conscious attempt to defamiliarise the familiar on the part of the 
author, giving voice to and requiring of the reader an ethical 
positioning that, far from being divorced from formal 
experimentation, turns it into an effective vehicle for revision, 
reflection and commitment.  
 
 
Martin Amis has often referred to the Holocaust as the crucial 
event of the twentieth century.2 In an interview with Jonathan Noakes 
(2003: 20), he refers to the Holocaust as a theme he has long been 
interested in, though he admits that writing a novel on it was an entirely 
                                                 
1 The research carried out for the writing of this paper has been financed by the 
Spanish Ministry of Science and Technology (MCYT) and the European Regional 
Development Fund (no. HUM2004−00344/FIL). 
2 See, for instance, Bellante (1992: 16). 
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different matter. He respects those who think that the Holocaust 
should not be written about, but he does not agree with those who 
automatically reject the use of “sophisticated or witty ironic means for 
writing about something serious” (20).  In his view, one cannot become 
a different kind of writer because of the subject, and there is no subject 
literature is barred from. As he explains in another interview: “I felt I 
was in a forest of taboos throughout writing this book [Time’s Arrow]. 
This is the most difficult and sensitive subject ever, I think, but I do 
believe, as a writer, that there are no No Entry signs” (in Watchel, 1996: 
17). 
What seemed to be at issue in the decades after World War II 
was not only Holocaust literature but literature itself. Theodor W. 
Adorno’s famous assertion that it was “barbaric to write poetry after 
Auschwitz” (1997: 34) pointed to silence as the only possible ethical 
response in the aftermath of the massacre. Adorno later modified his 
views, arguing that “[p]erennial suffering has as much a right to 
expression as a tortured man has to scream; hence it may have been 
wrong to say that after Auschwitz you could no longer write poems” 
(1973: 362). Victims, their descendants, the Jewish people have a right 
to speak. Their testimonies have also shown their commitment to a 
duty: that of bearing witness. Survivors’ narratives have made for the 
rise a new genre and they have also created an “other”: fictionalised 
accounts of the Holocaust, which have been thoroughly questioned, or 
at least questioned in a way that survivors’ narratives have not. As 
Susan Vice points out, “critical preference for testimony over fiction 
has become such a truism that it is hard to find any voices dissenting 
from it” (2000: 3).  
As if in response to this generalised feeling that Holocaust 
literature belongs to the victims (and their descendants), Amis remarks: 
“People say, legitimately in a way, what am I as an Aryan doing with 
this subject? But I’m writing about the perpetrators and they are my 
brothers, if you like. I feel a kind of responsibility in my Aryanness for 
what happened. This is my racial link with these events, not with the 
sufferers but with the perpetrators” (in Watchel, 1996: 47). The 
Holocaust happened to all. As Pilar Hidalgo explains, to “a generation 
of British novelists born after the Second World War, the Holocaust 
has come to epitomise not something alien in its enormity, perpetrated 
in faraway places, but something that is linked to what it is to be 
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human” (2005: 250). I agree with Hidalgo when she argues that 
Holocaust novels fulfil the function of imaginary witnesses,3 though I 
would emphasise Martin Amis’ point that bearing witness requires that 
we consider not only those to which the Holocaust happened, in the 
most strict sense of the term —Holocaust victims— but also those that 
made it happen —the perpetrators. If the Holocaust is, in Hidalgo’s 
words above, linked to what it is to be human, it is also because it 
makes us face the fact that the most ordinary human beings can be 
capable of the most inhuman acts. Thus, it is a key decision on Amis’ 
part to focus on a perpetrator rather than a victim. Odilo Unverdorben, 
a Nazi doctor who installed the pellets of Zyclon B to gas prisoners at 
Auschwitz, is also, as the narrator points out, “absolutely unexceptional, 
liable to do what everybody else does, good or bad, with no limit, once 
over the cover of numbers”.4 To quote Hannah Arendt’s well-known 
phrase, which she first used in her analysis of the 1961 trial of Adolf 
Eichmann, Time’s Arrow can be said to confront its reader with the 
“banality of evil”. 
 Narrated in reverse chronological order, Time’s Arrow ends in 
Odilo Unverdorben’s birthplace, Solingen, which was also the 
birthplace of Adolf Eichmann —the man responsible for overseeing 
the Final Solution. Hannah Arendt attended the Eichmann trial in 
Jerusalem as a reporter for the New Yorker and she was struck by the 
fact that he lacked all the demonic qualities that the prosecution had 
attributed to him. Against the traditional concept of evil seen as 
ultimate depravity, corruption or sinfulness, she argued that the 
shocking truth that the trial revealed had to do, rather, with “the 
fearsome, word-and-thought-defying banality of evil” (1984: 287, 
emphasis in the original). 
“Casual killing” is difficult to understand and so people tend to 
push it to the borders of the mind. Amis’ novel seeks to undo this 
impulse by taking on board the unaccommodatable fact that monsters 
                                                 
3 See also Marianne Hirsch’s notion of “postmemory” (1997, 2001) and Geoffrey 
Hartman’s concept of “witnesses by adoption” (1996). Hirsch’s postmemory points to 
an intersubjective space of remembrance, connected with a cultural or collective trauma 
that is not strictly based on identity or familial connections. Hartman’s coinage also 
suggests an enlargement of the familial framework to encompass broader spaces of 
empathy and identification. 
4 Time’s Arrow 165, emphasis added. Hereafter the abbreviation TA will be used in 
parenthetical references. 
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are not necessary for extreme evil. Nothing is more cathartic than the 
translation of fact into fable, the fable of seeing the Nazis as devilish 
arch-villains or of reducing the Holocaust to a series of commonplaces. 
Amis plays with this impulse to reduce fact to fable, precisely by having 
the narrator tell a fable that has to be decoded into fact by the reader. 
In addition to the focus on a perpetrator rather than a victim, the 
“doubled” narrator and the reverse narration are key choices on Amis’ 
part, formal choices that nonetheless bear upon the novel’s ethical 
import.  
The issue of the ordinariness of the perpetrators also lies at the 
core of Robert Jay Lifton’s The Nazi Doctors (1986), a work explicitly 
referred to by Amis in the “Afterword” as one of the novel’s main 
intertexts. Like Time’s Arrow, Lifton’s study focuses on the perpetrators 
and, more specifically, on the role played by doctors in the Holocaust, 
which the author connects with the “biomedical vision” at the heart of 
Nazism. Thus, The Nazi Doctors is an exploration of the psychology of 
the doctors who helped to administer the Final Solution. As Lifton 
succinctly but clarifyingly explains in an interview (Kreisler, 1999), the 
inverted logic which turned healers into killers was made possible by a 
process of psychological doubling. Nazi doctors joined the party 
seeking the promise of revitalisation that Hitler offered. Each of them 
joined first the medical profession, which is a group of its own, and 
then the military, being sent to a camp. They were not killers to begin 
with, but ordinary men that were socialised to evil. In the camps, they 
made selections and ran the killing process. When they were in 
Auschwitz, they had an Auschwitz self which was responsible for all 
this as well as for the very vulgar life (sex, alcohol and obscene jokes) 
that they led there. But they would go home to their families, from 
Poland or Germany, for weekends or for leaves. There they would be 
ordinary fathers and husbands functioning in a relatively ordinary way, 
calling for a non-Auschwitz self or a prior, more humane, self. 
Although the two selves were obviously part of the same overall self, 
each of them functioned separately, and that is why Lifton speaks of 
doubling as a mechanism of socialisation to evil.  
Much of the irony but also much of the tragic vision that 
emerges from Time’s Arrow is grounded on a similar doubling which 
keeps narrating and narrated subjects apart. In a sense, the narrator and 
the character whose life the novel tells are one and the same. Thus, the 
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narrator introduces himself as Tod Friendly, one of the names adopted 
by Odilo Unverdorben after the war.5 In another sense, the narrator 
cannot be described as autodiegetic since the connection between 
narrative instance and main character is but a measure of the rift 
between them. This narrator, neither homodiegetic nor heterodiegetic, 
is a “passenger or parasite” travelling with the main character towards 
“his secret”, a secret which will be “bad and non intelligible” (TA 73). 
The narrator lacks access to his host’s thoughts, but he is not barred 
from his emotions, or from his nightmares. Although he is “equipped 
with a fair amount of value-free information, or general knowledge” 
and a “superb vocabulary” (TA 16), he is unaware that his backward 
trajectory through time violates ordinary chronology. He is also utterly 
ignorant of history. And, most remarkably, he possesses a notable 
aversion to human suffering. In this sense, the narrator has much to do, 
then, with that prior, more humane, non-Auschwitz self silenced and 
erased by the Nazi doctors analysed by Lifton. By contrast, the 
protagonist stands for a Hippocrates-free Auschwitz self, unable to 
become whole again after the war. The two parts of his self have 
become so radically divided from one another that the main character 
does indeed appear soulless, empty, utterly alone: “His isolation is 
complete because he doesn’t know I’m here” (TA 22, italics in the 
original). 
The protagonist excluding that part of himself that would have 
made him responsive to the Other, responsible in the face of the Other, 
can also be read in ethical terms. A key idea in Levinasian ethics, which 
already appears in the early philosophical essay De l’evasion (1935), is the 
concept of excendance. De l’evasion expresses the imperative of escape, but 
escape from what exactly? To Gibson, the notion of escape as posited 
by Levinas is an escape from the view of the self as closed to the Other, 
defined in opposition to, rather than in relationship with the Other. As 
                                                 
5 Both names include binaries in a significant way. Tod means death in German, thus 
bringing to mind the notion of “friendly death” connected with the eugenistic project 
of Nazism —the eradication of what the Nazis referred to as “life unworthy of life”— 
and with their resort to gassing as a more “humane” method of killing. Regarding the 
protagonist’s real name, Richard Menke, among other critics, points out that with “its 
implicit, structural antithesis (unverdorben means ‘not verdorben,’ ‘not polluted or 
corrupt’), the name encapsulates the dual structure of the narrative, which opposes the 
life history of Odilo (hideous and banal, lived forward) with that of his doppelgänger 
(striking and scrupulous, lived backwards)” (1998: 965). 
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he puts it: “excendance is the spontaneous and immediate desire to escape 
the limits of the self […]. Evasion is the ethical impulse towards or 
openness to the other that effects a release from the confines of the 
self” (Gibson, 1999: 37, italics in the original). Thus, if in the light of 
Lifton’s theory, the fission that accounts for the separation between the 
narrator and the protagonist of Time’s Arrow can be seen as grounded in 
a process of psychological doubling as a mechanism of socialisation to 
evil, in the light of Levinasian ethics the said fission is the consequence 
of Unverdorben’s successful resistance to excendance, a resistance that 
amounts to the annulment, the complete stifling of the self’s drive to 
escape his own limits in a movement of openness to the Other.  
Any author’s choices to adopt one narrative strategy rather 
than another affect the reader’s ethical response to the text, but certain 
choices demand a more active kind of engagement on the reader’s part. 
In Time’s Arrow, the horror of the Holocaust disappears if the events are 
read backwards, but the reader knows that history cannot be undone, 
and so, it is the reader who has to supply the tragedy missing in the 
text: 
 
The reader has to do all the morality, because these 
terrible events are described as benevolent, but also 
in such a way that, I hope, there is a sort of disgust 
and an unreality and self-delusion in the way it’s 
shown. He [the narrator] keeps wondering why it has 
to be so ugly, this essentially benevolent action, why 
it is so filthy and ugly. It was a coprocentric universe. 
They called Auschwitz “anus mundi”. So it’s there, 
but the narrator can’t spot it, the reader has to do all 
that. (Amis in Reynolds and Noakes, 2003: 21, 
emphasis in the original) 
 
Just as the narrator’s enigmatic identity may disconcert the 
reader, so the attention he pays to coprocentric details accounts for a 
discomfort that announces the utter disgust he will feel at Auschwitz: 
“What tells me that this is right? What tells me that all the rest was 
wrong? Certainly not my aesthetic sense. I would never claim that 
Auschwitz-Birkenau-Monowitz was good to look at. Or to listen to, or 
to smell, or to taste, or to touch” (TA 128). The narrative focus on 
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coprocentricy that Amis refers to in the quotation above somehow 
turns the narrator’s aesthetic unconscious, so to put it, into a vehicle for 
the ethical positioning of the reader. Thus, what may initially appear as 
a source of scatological humour soon acquires an allegorical resonance. 
In this Amis is reminiscent of Jonathan Swift, another satirist with 
whom he has more than once been compared. Thus, it would not be 
farfetched to apply to Time’s Arrow what Philip Pinkus explains about 
the connotations of coprocentricy in Swiftian satire: 
 
Since Swift’s constant concern in his satires is man’s 
corruption from original innocence, there is no more 
graphic illustration than the excremental. That is why 
his satires are obsessed with it. It is the traditional 
imagery of evil, of which Swift’s contemporaries 
were well aware […]. All Swift’s references to the 
unclean flesh, the dung, the stench, the filth of man’s 
body, are the symbols of man’s sin. (1965: 18) 
 
Dante pictured hell as a frozen cesspool into which all the 
rivers of the world dump their sewage. In the same line, the narrator 
reflects on the appropriateness of the term used by the camp officers to 
refer to Auschwitz: Anus Mundi. He can think “of no finer tribute than 
that” (TA 133) since there “this human stuff, at normal times (and in 
civilised locales) tastefully confined to the tubes and runnels, 
subterranean, unseen —this stuff has burst its banks, surging upward 
on to the floor, the walls, the ceiling of life” (TA 125). Thus, the 
narrator’s journey towards the protagonist’s dark secret is also a descent 
into hell. In a remarkably Swiftian way (think, for instance of A Modest 
Proposal), the description of this journey is deprived of horror precisely 
in order to increase the reader’s horror, deprived of tragedy precisely in 
order that the reader will supply it. What the narrator’s account is not 
deprived of is his feelings of disgust. The reader’s tragic view of events 
is then but an answer to the narrator’s unease at the ugliness of 
creation, at the crap surrounding an essentially praiseworthy task which 
strangely has “a patina of cruelty, intense cruelty, as if creation 
corrupts” (TA 130). To use Pinkus’ words above, the narrator can be 
said to provide us with “the unclean flesh, the dung, the stench, the 
filth of man’s body”, which clash with what he sees as the Nazis’ 
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benevolent actions. It falls on the reader to see them as a measure of 
“man’s sin”. 
It is significant that in the midst of this Anus Mundi which 
Auschwitz was, Nazi officers —the real ones and also those that appear 
in Amis’ novel (TA 128)— took pains to be “elegant”. The way in 
which the Nazi subject turned the Other into an object of abjection and 
kept it at bay while it went on a mad quest for order and tidiness —a 
quest for elegance— is but a measure, in Levinasian terms, of a mode 
of being predicated on the nihilistic destruction of the Other to assure 
the self. This human subject did not acknowledge its diacritic relation 
between itself and the Other, which constitutes the basis of Levinasian 
ethics. Rather, it tragically sought to define its humanity by depriving 
the Other of it, and in the attempt, it became inhuman itself. As Primo 
Levi puts it in his memoirs, the “personages of these pages are not 
men, their humanity is buried, or they have themselves buried it, under 
an offence received or inflicted on someone else” (1996: 121). Thus, it 
becomes clear that if the offence received annihilated the prisoners’ 
humanity, the offence inflicted also did away with that of the 
perpetrators. This is a central aspect of “the nature of the offence”, a 
phrase that Amis takes from Levi (as he explains in the “Afterword”) 
and that constitutes the novel’s subtitle. Amis incorporates into the 
novel what can be seen as the governing idea of Levi’s memoirs, 
namely, that the Holocaust obliterated the humanity of both the 
oppressed and the oppressors. 
Halfway down the narrative, the narrator advances that he “will 
know how bad the [protagonist’s] secret is”, that he “will know the 
nature of the offence” (TA 73, italics in the original). But does the 
narrator understand it in the end? Such an awareness would depend on 
his realisation that he has been (re-)living Odilo’s life in the reverse, 
which is what the words “Oh no, but then…” cryptically suggest in the 
novel’s final paragraph:  
 
Beyond, before the slope of pine, the lady archers 
are gathering with their targets and bows. Above, a 
failing vision kind of light, with the sky fighting 
down its nausea. Its many nuances of nausea. When 
Odilo closes his eyes I see an arrow fly —but 
wrongly. Point-first. Oh no, but then… We’re away 
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once more, over the field. Odilo Unverdorben and 
his eager heart. And I within, who came at the wrong 
time —either too soon, or after it was too late. (TA 
173) 
 
The fact that the protagonist and the narrator should be “away 
once more, over the field” may indeed suggest that the story begins 
again, in chronological order. In a figurative sense, this repetition may 
imply that the Holocaust should not and cannot be forgotten, only 
endlessly retold. In addition, though, the novel’s last lines can also 
suggest that the Holocaust may happen again. And yet, as the story is 
told, backwards in time, things must happen only because they have already 
happened, but such determinism disappears if time’s arrow is reversed 
again, and it is reversed at the end of the novel. Strictly speaking, the 
narrator has come soon if the story begins again and the Holocaust has 
not happened, or late, if it has indeed taken place. There is, though, a 
recurrent preoccupation in Amis’ fiction which I think is implicit in the 
novel’s ending: the nuclear holocaust. Thus, the narrator’s arrival is a 
late arrival if we think of the Nazi Holocaust, but it is an early one if we 
think of the other Holocaust, the nuclear one. And this, unlike the 
other, does not have to happen, precisely because it has not happened. 
The openness of the ending is also the openness of the future to which 
the last lines, like the arrow of time, point. In this light, and as is the 
case with the narrator and the novel’s time scheme, the reader’s ethical 
obligation becomes double: towards the past, which cannot be 
forgotten, and towards the future, which s/he must equally bear in 
mind.  
In Time’s Arrow, then, Amis invites us to think the unthinkable, 
in the past as well as in the future. As Levinas puts it, the question of 
the meaning of being is not “why we are”, but “how to be”, that is, 
“how being justifies itself” (1989: 86). Time’s Arrow shows some of the 
most drastic ways in which being fails to do so. But will the future 
mirror the past? Will the Holocaust return with a vengeance? A look at 
Amis’ fiction and non-fiction is enough to ascertain that his prospects 
are far from bright in this respect. And yet, at least, Time’s Arrow bears 
witness to the writer’s ethical obligation to speak in the face of the 
unspeakable, to his struggle to find new forms to accommodate the 
mess. If there are themes which, because of their very nature, require of 
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the novelist a different kind of imaginative and ethical involvement, 
Amis’ response to this challenge in Time’s Arrow consists of a conscious 
attempt to defamiliarise the familiar, giving voice to and requiring of 
the reader an ethical positioning that, far from being divorced from 
formal experimentation, turns it into an effective vehicle for revision, 
reflection and commitment. 
 
 
References 
 
Adorno, T. W. 1973. Negative Dialectics. Translated by E. B. Ashton. London: 
Routledge and Kegan Paul. 
---. 1997. Prisms. Translated by Samuel Weber and Shierry Weber. Cambridge: 
The Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press. 
Amis, M. 2003 [1991]. Time’s Arrow or The Nature of the Offence. London: 
Vintage. 
Arendt, H. 1984. Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil (revised 
and enlarged edition). Harmondsworth: Penguin. 
Bellante, C. and J. Bellante. 1992. “Unlike Father, Like Son. An Interview with 
Martin Amis”. Bloomsbury Review 12: 2. 4–5, 16. 
Gibson, A. 1999. Postmodernity, Ethics and the Novel. From Leavis to Levinas. 
London: Routledge. 
Hartman, G. 1996. The Longest Shadow: In the Aftermath of the Holocaust. 
Bloomington: Indiana University Press. 
Hidalgo, P. 2005. “Representing the Holocaust in Martin Amis’s Time’s Arrow 
and Caryl Phillips’s The Nature of Blood”. Towards an Understanding of the 
English Language, Past, Present and Future: Studies in Honour of Fernando 
Serrano. J. L. Martínez-Dueñas. Ed. 247–260. Granada: Universidad de 
Granada. 
Hirsch, M. 1997. Photography, Narrative and Postmemory. Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press. 
---. 2001. “Surviving Images: Holocaust Photographs and the Role of Post-
memory”. The Holocaust and Visual Culture. B. Zelizar. Ed. 214–246. New 
Brunswick: Rutgers UP. 
Kreisler, H. 1999. “Evil, the Self and Survival. Conversation with Robert J. 
Lifton”. Conversations with History (Institute of International Studies, UC 
Berkeley). 2 November 2007. 
<http://globetrotter.berkeley.edu/people/Lifton/lifton-con4.html> 
Levi, P. 1996. Survival in Auschwitz: The Nazi Assault on Humanity. Translated by 
Stuart Woolf. New York: Simon. 
Levinas, E. 1982 [1935]. De l’evasion. Paris: Fata Morgana. 
MARÍA JESÚS MARTÍNEZ-ALFARO 
 
507 
---. 1989. “Ethics as First Philosophy”. The Levinas Reader. Translated by Seán 
Hand and Michael Temple. Seán Hand. Ed. 75–87. Oxford: Blackwell. 
Lifton, R. J. 1986. The Nazi Doctors: Medical Killing and the Psychology of Genocide. 
New York: Basic Books. 
Menke, R. 1998. “Narrative Reversals and the Thermodynamics of History in 
Martin Amis’s Time’s Arrow”. Modern Fiction Studies 44: 4. 959–980. 
Noakes, J. 2003. “Interview with Martin Amis”. M. Reynolds and J. Noakes. 
2003. 12–26. 
Pinkus, P. 1965. “Sin and Satire in Swift”. Bucknell Review 13: 2. 11–25. 
Reynolds, M. and J. Noakes. 2003. Martin Amis. The Essential Guide (Vintage 
Living Texts Series). London: Vintage. 
Vice, S. 2000. Holocaust Fiction. London: Routledge. 
Watchel, E. 1996. “Eleanor Watchel with Martin Amis: Interview”. Malahat 
Review 114: March. 45–64. 
 
